

Report on the Memo of Feb 4, 2016 "Proposal for Performance Audit of the Tucson Police Dept." Submitted to the Independent Audit and Performance Commission

by James Hannley

Preface

This report is to summarize all informal findings from an informal inquiry on the subject to date. The memo contained comments and questions related to five areas of concern to me. During this ensuing period, interviews were conducted with members of the Tucson Police Dept., the Office of the Independent Police Auditor and numerous documents were received by the IAPC. Some research was conducted by me informally and these documents are contained in this report.

Areas of Concern

1. Misconduct
2. Productivity
3. Hardware and equipment cost/benefit
4. Planning for possible effect of changed laws upon application of resources
5. Competitive compensation structure

Misconduct

Items 1-3 have not been addressed. Item 4; regarding policies and procedures for addressing officers who have a history of misconduct was answered during a meeting of the IAPC with Liana Perez, Independent Auditor and Civilian Investigator. During this meeting, the policies and procedures for addressing officers accused of misconduct were reviewed. Also discussed was the role of the Citizen Police Advisory Review Board. The concern that misconduct due to officers continuing to serve despite risks of misconduct was met.

Productivity

The memo presented the information from the report "General Fund Fiscal Year 2016 First Quarter Update" by which it was learned that court filings had experienced a 58% decline from the second quarter of 2015. This decline caused a downward projection of revenue from fines and forfeitures of \$2.8M (\$3.3M projected from the report; a decline of 23.1%).

Item 1; "To what does the TPD attribute a decline in court filings?" This question led to an inquiry into police functions that lead to "legal infractions"; mostly traffic enforcement citations. Because traffic enforcement is a "core mission" according to Chief Magnus, and data for this activity is readily available, traffic enforcement has become a focus of this concern.

I found on the Tucson Police Dept. (TPD) website "Traffic Citations Demographics" that contain the record of traffic stops for every calendar quarter from the first quarter (Q1) of 2014 through the third quarter (Q3) of 2016. This record is shown in the graph and table on the following page.

Table 1




Table 2

Date	Traffic Stops	Civil Citations	Criminal Citations	Warnings
2014 Q1	24344	15631	2167	6029
Q2	25597	16849	2227	6002
Q3	29390	20817	2460	5520
Q4	24426	15123	2065	6727
2015 Q1	21163	12166	1800	6710
Q2	20286	11968	1700	6147
Q3	14789	7538	1560	5321
Q4	14403	7205	1422	5426
2016 Q1	14070	7908	1406	4414
Q2	15841	10621	1370	3526
Q3	12693	8142	1197	3036

Here, we see a dramatic decline in traffic stops year over year from Q1 2015: 21,163 to Q1 2016: 14,070; 7,093 fewer; a 33.5% decline. Civil citations show a following of the stops: down 4,258 (12,166 Q1 15 to 7,908 Q1 16) or a decline of 34.9%. The most dramatic quarter to quarter change is found between Q2 2015 (20,286) to Q3 2015 (14,789). This is a decline of 27%. The decline from the peak (Q3 2014) 29,290 to the latest quarter available (Q3 2016) 12,693 is a decline of 56.8%.

To date, Chief Magnus and Mr. Prater, Chief Financial Officer of TPD have been able to offer no explanation other than officers feel that traffic enforcement takes a secondary priority to "911" service calls. Chief Magnus also confided to us that he believes that most patrol officers believe that traffic enforcement can be left to "somebody else". It is unlikely that Tucson drivers have dramatically improved their behavior to the point that TPD Patrol and TE Officers are witnessing 33.5% fewer infractions year over year.

Surprisingly, in current Fiscal Year 16/17, TPD position resources in the Traffic Enforcement Division (TE) were cut 30.7% (36 assigned officers) from FY15/16 (52 assigned officers). TE budget Salaries and Benefits was cut 19.8% (M\$6.094 to \$4.884). Total TE budget was cut 33.69% (M\$7.557 to \$5.010) year over year (YOY). In the FY 2018 budget, the Traffic Enforcement Division whose mission "...involves a continuous effort to improve traffic safety..." has been abolished altogether. Further evidence of the decline in emphasis of traffic enforcement is that "Patrol" whose officers are likely to encounter traffic infractions, also had their allocation of officers cut from 639 in the FY 2016 budget to 589 in the FY 2017 budget; a reduction of 50 officers or 7.8%. In the "Department Measures of Performance" section of the TPD budget, traffic enforcement is not listed.

There is little evidence that driver behavior is so much improved that TPD realize a cost-savings opportunity by reducing the TE positions almost 20% and a corresponding budget savings of almost 34%. This report will not attempt to prove the connection between consistent robust traffic enforcement and better driver behavior; i.e. wide compliance with traffic laws. There is substantial literature to show that there is a definite cause and effect. To the public, while there may be many "scofflaws" who enjoy committing traffic infractions in an environment of lax enforcement, a given is that observance of traffic laws should be taken for granted.

The effects of declining traffic law compliance are found in the mortality and morbidity statistics that are available. For instance, Tucson was ranked 9th in the nation for most red-light running deaths by the National Coalition for Safer Roads based upon government statistics gathered between 2004 and 2013 as reported by KVOA NEWS 4 Tucson Aug. 19, 2015 (see appendix 1). Anecdotally, I recall a report last week that two people riding on a motorcycle on Wilcox Rd. were killed in a collision with a pickup truck in the intersection. No citations had been issued at the time of the report in the Arizona Daily Star. Traffic fatalities within the City of Tucson as of end of August 2016 (the most recent available to me) year to date number 26 (including 7 pedestrian/auto fatalities) and that this is one more than YTD August 2015. Other metrics such as number of accidents (Table 3) do not seem to justify this change in traffic enforcement as a priority of the TPD.

Table 3

YEAR	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010
Accidents	4,905	4,508	4,863	5,021	4,215	9,720
Fatalities	53	39	44	43	54	51
Injuries	2,428	2,272	2,458	2,622	2,467	3,561
Est.Cost Pima	\$140.3M	\$134.6M	\$136.6M	\$152.1M	\$143.8M	\$139.4M

If public safety is the overall priority of TPD, what serious crimes; crimes that risk a fatality are taking priority over traffic enforcement? Frankly, I agree with Chief Magnus that enforcement of traffic law is a core police function. Through consistently applied enforcement, driver compliance is improved and street safety follows.

The answer to Item #1, "why the sudden and persistent decline in traffic stops?" I believe may be found in a report by Yoohyun Jung on Oct. 9, 2014 for the Arizona Daily Star (see appendix 2). This article reveals that in January of 2013, former Chief of TPD, Alberto Villasenor imposed "performance expectations" on TPD patrol officers. The Tucson Police Officers Association (TPOA) pushed back with TPOA government affairs director Jason Winsky declaring, "We're just philosophically opposed to any kind of quota". Chief Villasenor believed that "One ticket a day is not something that would be considered a quota in my mind". Villasenor continued, "Traffic contact deter bad habits" and, "Our traffic enforcement had become almost non-existent (before the requirement). There was less than one traffic contact per week and that was unacceptable". He also asserted that "Having a strong traffic program saves more lives and property damage *than anything else the department can do. There are more traffic accidents than any property or violent crime* (emphasis mine).

This leads a careful observer of the graph of Table 1, to conclude that if earlier data were made available, he would see a trough to the left of that rising peak to Q3 2014. I have requested earlier as well as Q4 2016 reports through public channels at the TPD but I have received no response.

The TPOA, unhappy with the "quotas" that had been imposed upon them sought to have legislation to prohibit an Arizona Police Dept. from setting citation quotas on patrol officers. The article reveals that Arizona House Rep. Bruce Wheeler, who was running to be re-elected in District 10 to the Arizona House was working with the TPOA to produce a bill and stated that he believed that (quotas) "were not a good idea".

A bill to prohibit quotas was introduced in the Arizona 2015 Legislature subsequent to this article. The Chiefs of Police Association weighed in against it and ultimately, it was defeated. The 2015 Legislative session ended in May or June, the second quarter of 2015. It was between the second and third quarters of 2015 that showed the most precipitous drop in traffic stops for the period. I think it is fair to answer the question of why this precipitous and sustained decline in traffic enforcement is that this is a shortcoming of management of the Tucson Police Dept. The allocation of resources does not seem to reflect traffic enforcement as a "core police function". From the history of the quotas and the conflict

with the TPOA, it is fair to conclude that Tucson Patrol Officers do not like to make traffic stops and that they will present a declining effort in this activity unless they are compelled to produce citations. It seems, from my perspective that the interests of the public safety must prevail over the discretion of the officers whose job it is to make our streets and roads safer.

Some commissioners were wondering if other crime was taxing the resources of the TPD to cause a decline in traffic enforcement. I just want to point out that at its peak in 1995, Part 1 crimes were 54,980. The 1995 population was 442,910. That is 12.4 crimes/100,000 people. In 2016 there were 35,537 Part 1 crimes of a population of 545,092. This is 6/100,000. Not only are there 19,443 (35%) fewer crimes than the peak but there are significantly fewer crimes per 100,000 people. From this, it does not seem to be that TPD is extraordinarily busy with crime other than traffic crimes. If our commissioners are wondering if there has been a significant reduction in TPD budget resources, please find attached the table "Budget" "Police" FY 2007 - FY 2016.

Mr. Silva confirms there has been a decline in traffic enforcement within the city between Jan. 1, 2014 and Sept. 30, 2016. It is reassuring to read his words that the "safety of (all road users) is a primary concern to all of us". Mr. Silva asserts that there are many factors to explain the decline in enforcement. He lists as one of those the reduction in citations issued because of the end of photo enforcement. I apologize if I am wrong that in the quarterly "Traffic Citations Demographics" reports published by the TPD apply only to officer conducted traffic stops. If so, then this is not one of the factors. The factor of budget reductions, in my opinion is not a strong one since a review of the budget of the TPD over the past ten years shows a very stable level of funding. This year's \$14M cut was in reality a \$14 cut from the operations budget converted to \$7 in capital improvements funding. Regarding the effect of "full service policing" effect on improving driver compliance with traffic laws, this is a very broad approach to policing; it seems to me it would not be very direct in influencing driver behavior, at least over the short run. The short run sees people killed and maimed on the streets of Tucson too many times each year. Mr. Silva acknowledges that this model does take away from resources that could be (or perhaps was) dedicated to traffic enforcement. Mr. Silva goes on to say that, there is not "a single basis" for seeing an increase in traffic collisions at the same time there was a reduction in enforcement. He goes on to say that, traffic collisions are on the rise nationwide. Yes, that may be true but the experience of Tucson is a parallel phenomenon to this not a result or a cause of it. Yet, we know that Tucson ranks very high in red-light running mortality nationwide. Therefore, Mr. Silva would have to agree that Tucson is actually a leader in this national phenomenon. He does not, for instance cite road conditions or lighting, as important factors but it would be hard to argue that these conditions are so bad within the city to be very important, anyway. All the national literature I have seen places a very clear cause and effect between traffic enforcement and safer driver behavior. Mr. Silva describes some new strategies the TPD is employing: focused enforcement of problem intersections, targeted enforcement, and partnering with local media to raise awareness. All of these approaches are laudable. However, are they producing the results that traditional "stop and cite" policing has demonstrated nationwide? How long should the public wait to test this new approach?

How many lives might be lost in the interim? On the other hand, in my report, I cite very strong evidence that Tucson Police do not like to make traffic stops and that it is a low priority. This is my greatest concern. I remain convinced that for the good of the city, the public safety, the measurable productivity of the Tucson Police Dept. some method of motivation to bring this activity to an acceptable level must be found.

Item 4, "Can accident rates be used to measure police productivity?" Yes.

Item 5, "What proportion of TPD man-hours is dedicated to traffic enforcement?" Unknown.

Hardware and equipment cost/benefit

Item 1 "What is the annual cost of maintenance and operation of this fleet of aircraft"?

The IAPC did receive this information and Chairman Oberg observed that the fleet of two operational, one for parts helicopters of the Tucson Police Dept. have a cost per hour of operation of "about \$1,000". During this review, many of my fellow commissioners remarked that perhaps more cost-effective hardware for this purpose might be drones; some of which are already in a test phase by the Sahuarita Police Dept., I think it is.

Item2 "Is there existing metrics for determining the benefit to public safety?" We also discussed and it has not been made clear what role the helicopters play in police work. Are they primarily used for locating suspects in dark alleys? Do they serve primarily for the safety of the police officers on the ground or is there a public safety element as well? The TPD also owns a fixed-wing aircraft but it is not clear what its purpose is.

Planning for possible effect of changed laws upon application of resources

Item 1 "What is the current allocation of TPD resources to enforcement of laws prohibiting the production, sale, distribution, and consumption of marijuana?" The TPD was unable to produce a clear number for this question during our discussions.

Item 2 "Has the TPD a plan in place to review the allocation of these resources and the possible reallocation of those resources in the event of legalization?" We now know that marijuana remains illegal for recreational use in Arizona. However, the answer to the question was no.

Competitive Compensation Structure

This section of the memo was prefaced with a question does the TPD have more than 300 officers with annual compensation of \$100,000 or more?

Item 1 "Is the current management structure of the TPD "top heavy?" Through our discussion with CFO Prater of the TPD we learned that base pay of Lieutenants is approx. \$110,000; Sergeants is approximately \$75,000. The numbers of these two positions is far below 300.

Item 2 "How does the structure of compensation compare to police depts. in similar-sized cities?"

We have not done any formal comparison of the TPD management structure to other similar sized cities to definitively answer this question.

Item 3 "What is the experience of allocation of overtime in the TPD? Are watch commanders routinely questioned about overtime?" We had a thorough discussion with Mr. Prater on this topic and it is clear that the TPD is effective on monitoring allocation of overtime.

Item 4 "What proportion of total officer compensation is represented by overtime on average?" It is not clear if this specific question was asked of Mr. Prater. I do not recall getting even a rough estimate of this number.

Item 5 "is there a policy and procedure for examining the experience of overtime to determine the element(s) that drive the need for overtime?" During our discussions with Mr. Prater it was learned that court appearances by patrol officers is the most common need for overtime. He told us that management personnel do look out for officers who seem to have an untypical amount of overtime. It is unknown from these discussions if ever there has been a comprehensive study within the TPD of overtime patterns and how to reduce it.

Conclusion

I want to thank Chairman Oberg and my fellow Commissioners for their patience and support during this inquiry. Although a formal performance audit of the TPD was not adopted by the IAPC, a great deal of scrutiny was conducted and much was learned. I recommend that the IAPC adopt this report and supply it to City Manager Mike Ortega, TPD Chief Magnus, Mayor and Council, the Press and any other interested parties for the good of the community.

Attachments:

1 – Appendix

2 – Part I Crimes by Type and Year

3 – Police Budget for Fiscal Years 2007 through 2016

4 – TPD Traffic Enforcement Trends Memorandum dated March 1, 2017

5 – Proposal for Performance Audit of Tucson Police Department

Appendix

1.



2. "Police union calls for elimination of traffic-ticket quota" October 09, 2014 10:00 AM by Yoohyun Jung
Arizona Daily Star http://tucson.com/news/blogs/police-beat/police-union-calls-for-elimination-of-traffic-ticket-quota/article_2cde50a7-10a0-5e18-8908-7335510ce811.html

TUCSON POLICE DEPARTMENT
Official Uniform Crime Report Statistics:
Counts of Part I Crimes by Type and Year

Year	Tucson Population*	Homicide	Sexual Assault**	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Larceny**	Motor Vehicle Theft	Arson	Total Part I Offenses
1980	330,537	39	174	655	1,718	9,392	21,976	1,995	452	36,401
1981	343,450	31	163	872	1,747	10,521	22,126	1,784	483	37,727
1982	344,099	33	236	910	1,824	9,481	21,803	1,716	223	36,226
1983	349,236	28	253	766	1,731	9,568	20,954	1,665	191	35,156
1984	362,079	26	282	809	1,843	9,909	20,292	1,944	217	35,322
1985	372,295	33	297	1,051	2,333	9,914	22,586	2,036	253	38,503
1986	378,752	41	251	1,042	2,310	9,577	23,510	2,109	213	39,053
1987	389,372	24	281	911	2,308	7,954	28,888	1,951	246	42,563
1988	396,738	31	281	768	3,074	8,230	34,878	2,064	257	49,583
1989	398,022	46	276	877	2,654	8,411	36,774	2,253	250	51,541
1990	405,390	33	290	902	2,458	7,909	34,101	2,468	256	48,417
1991	409,755	27	331	889	2,620	7,493	28,281	3,469	179	43,289
1992	417,314	47	386	970	2,929	6,815	28,629	4,362	184	44,322
1993	424,733	44	314	894	3,111	7,363	32,076	5,143	162	49,107
1994	433,335	38	289	1,012	3,544	7,205	35,209	5,858	130	53,285
1995	442,910	65	292	1,192	3,877	5,995	37,235	6,049	275	54,980
1996	449,637	46	282	1,288	3,583	6,710	28,460	6,016	282	46,667
1997	458,676	50	291	1,446	3,329	6,921	29,571	6,819	260	48,687
1998	468,520	45	364	1,485	2,940	6,736	28,022	5,704	238	45,534
1999	475,450	38	245	1,281	2,745	6,077	27,157	4,839	300	42,682
2000	486,699	61	355	1,444	2,683	6,721	27,349	5,913	322	44,848
2001	498,305	43	322	1,698	2,757	6,553	31,217	7,164	355	50,109
2002	507,085	51	338	1,350	2,974	6,717	32,539	6,206	326	50,501
2003	514,725	50	330	1,478	2,854	6,397	34,542	6,359	285	52,295
2004	521,605	54	387	1,552	2,879	6,302	34,404	6,338	277	52,193
2005	529,770	56	378	1,685	2,930	5,130	19,642	6,527	307	36,655
2006	539,228	52	294	1,676	2,560	5,121	19,924	7,377	301	37,305
2007	544,770	51	277	1,432	2,345	4,788	21,299	6,767	280	37,239
2008	547,080	68	246	1,451	2,490	5,157	19,454	5,808	318	34,992
2009	543,454	35	205	1,246	2,075	5,062	18,189	3,565	225	30,602
2010	520,116	51	158	1,088	2,035	5,002	24,343	3,433	150	36,260
2011	522,815	52	204	1,163	2,022	4,979	20,623	2,746	167	31,956
2012	523,471	43	234	1,260	2,314	5,021	25,420	2,499	198	36,989
2013	524,646	46	218	1,002	2,103	4,957	27,440	2,190	151	38,107
2014	529,962	35	399	988	2,022	4,247	25,535	1,823	138	35,187
2015	537,129	31	422	1,059	1,960	3,664	29,592	1,929	117	38,774
2016	545,092	31	469	1,235	2,411	4,137	25,187	1,948	119	35,537

Source: Tucson Police Department, Consolidated Monthly Reports as Submitted to the FBI

**Change of reporting method for Larcenies occurred in 2005.

**Change in UCR definition of sexual assault effective Jan. 2014

*Population sources: (1) 1981 - 1989, 1991 - 1999, and 2001 - 2009 are estimates from the City of Tucson Department of Urban Planning and Design; (2) 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 are U.S. Census Bureau decennial counts; (3) 2011 - 2016 are projections from the Pima Association of Governments

Budget

Fiscal Year Budgeted Expenditures Percent of total amount being spent by City of Tucson

Police	2007	168,488,040	15.29%
	2008	164,960,230	15.13%
	2009	190,478,950	14.72%
	2010	173,492,180	13.24%
	2011	198,744,300	14.89%
	2012	163,326,490	12.20%
	2013	155,102,080	11.80%
	2014	162,442,700	12.77%
	2015	161,979,620	12.80%
	2016	167,648,220	12.25%



MEMORANDUM

DATE: March 1, 2017

TO: Independent Audit and
Performance Commission

FROM: Mike Silva
Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Tucson Police Department Traffic Enforcement Trends

The following supplemental information is provided in response to your request to help explain the decline in traffic enforcement within the City of Tucson from January 1, 2014 to September 30, 2016, as well as any impact this decline has had on traffic safety. We appreciate the opportunity to respond to your concerns. Ensuring the safety of all of our community motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians is a primary concern of the Tucson Police Department.

There is not any one factor that explains the reduction in traffic enforcement during this period, but rather, a confluence of variables contributed to this decline. During the period in which there was a reduction of citations, the city's red-light camera and photo-traffic enforcement programs were also eliminated (November, 2015). Additionally, the lingering fiscal impacts from the "Great Recession" continue to take a toll on our departmental operations and have contributed to the decline. To that point, we have experienced an overall reduction in personnel which has precipitated a dramatic reorganization of our resources to ensure that we have appropriate staffing in order to respond to emergency calls for service. For example, we were forced to eliminate our night-time motor officer squad and reduce the number of personnel assigned to our DUI enforcement squad. These are units in which citations are a primary focus of enforcement efforts.

As an initial response to the decline in citations prior to 2014, former Chief of Police Roberto Villaseñor, established a policy that set a ticket-a-day as a patrol wide performance standard. Chief Chris Magnus lifted that requirement when the department instituted a paradigm shift in the patrol service model, in order to ensure a higher quality of service for the community by engaging in "full-service policing." Full service policing places an emphasis on proactive engagement with the community to address crime and other community concerns. While perhaps contributing to a reduction in traffic enforcement, this shift in philosophy has been instrumental in strengthening community relationships, hopefully resulting in a greater net benefit to public safety.

While the City of Tucson has seen an increase in the number of traffic collisions during the same time period as the reduction of enforcement efforts, it would be inaccurate to identify the reduction of enforcement as the single basis for this phenomenon. As you may know, nationwide traffic collisions continue to increase. If you have not done so already, the Commission may benefit from the research and data made available from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). The information they gather on an annual basis may inform the

Commission's inquiry further, but it will certainly make clear that multiple, confounding variables continue to contribute to the increase in collisions.

TPD is constantly evaluating enforcement efforts and exploring new strategies for reducing the number of traffic collisions. Each patrol division Captain has an on-going collision mitigation strategy that is constantly being evaluated and modified based on a review of the available data month to month. These strategies include focused enforcement of the top collision intersections by motor officers, bringing back nighttime deployment of both Motor and Community Response Teams for targeted enforcement (red light violations, speeding, impaired or distracted driving, etc.), partnering with local media for education and awareness, and on-going discussions with the Tucson Department of Transportation regarding engineering modifications and street light timing. Divisional command staff consistently review and modify these strategies for efficiency and effectiveness and have been tasked by the Chief of Police to make collision reduction a continued point of emphasis.

Thank you for inquiring about this important issue. We look forward to your input and collaboration.

MS:JS

memo

Independent Audit and Performance Commission (IAPC) City of Tucson

To: Pete Saxton, Kevin Oberg, David Cormier, Bob Clark, Mark Crum, Jeff Singleton
From: James P. Hannley
CC: Councilperson Karin Uhlich
Date: 2/4/2016
Re: Proposal for Performance Audit of Tucson Police Dept

Comments: This memo is created at the request of the IAPC Chairman, Kevin Oberg from the February 3, 2016 regular monthly meeting of the IAPC

Introduction

Gentlemen, we are on the verge of studying of the 2016-2017 City of Tucson (COT) budget. I would like to call your attention to the fact that two COT Departments, Police and Fire consume more than 50% of the budget. In light of this, I think that it would be prudent for us to consider an examination of the performance of the Tucson Police Dept. (TPD) and the Tucson Fire Dept. This memo focuses on the TPD. These are some of the performance issues that might merit our examination.

Misconduct

A recent article appearing in the Arizona Daily Star reported on a study of the Chicago Police Dept. that found that 124 Commissioned Officers of a police force of 12,000 (about .01%) were responsible for misconduct court awards amounting to more than \$34M over the period from 2009 to 2016. More than 85% of the Chicago PD Officers have zero misconduct complaints on their record.

This example leads me to question how this issue presents in the Tucson Police Dept.

- 1) What is the total value of misconduct court awards for this same 7 year period?
- 2) What number of TPD Officers have had conduct that resulted in a jury award or a settlement?
- 3) What is the supervisory procedure for addressing an officer whose conduct has caused a monetary award?
- 4) Are there policies and procedures for addressing officers who have a history of misconduct?

Productivity

At our December meeting, we were presented with the report "General Fund Fiscal Year 2016 First Quarter Update". Slide #4 under the section "Revenues" reported that the COT is projecting a reduction in fines and forfeitures of \$2.8M. We were told that related to this projection, the City had experienced a 58% decline in court filings. Upon my questioning I recall being told that "court filings" are legal infractions (such as traffic tickets) referred to the court by law enforcement (TPD). This seems to be a quite large, possibly sudden decline.

- 1) To what does TPD attribute this?
- 2) Does this reflect a "sudden" decline in enforcement; particularly traffic enforcement?
- 3) If, as public health and safety experts suggest, the biggest daily threat to public safety is driving on streets and highways has there been a measurable improvement in driver behavior without a corresponding increase in traffic law enforcement?

memo

- 4) Can accident rates, the logical result of poor driving habits that are in turn, shaped by law enforcement be used to measure police productivity?
- 5) What proportion of TPD man-hours is dedicated to traffic enforcement?

Recent actions by Mayor and Council have reduced parking ticket fines.

- 6) What is the structure of moving violation fines?
- 7) What evidence is there to show the relationship between the size of traffic fines and deterrence of violations?
- 8) Do the size of ticket fines present a barrier; a reluctance to officer issuance?

Hardware and Equipment Cost / Benefit

An Arizona Daily Star article appeared in January reporting that the last action of Chief Villasenor was to ground the TPD "air force" for two weeks in December after the Department was unable to resolve a dispute between the ground crew and the pilots. This story revealed that the Tucson Police Department has a fleet of 3 helicopters and one fixed-wing aircraft

- 1) What is the annual cost of maintenance and operation of this fleet of aircraft?
- 2) Is there existing metrics for determining the benefit to public safety of police aircraft?

Planning for possible effect of changed laws upon application of resources

It is my understanding that it is possible that marijuana will become legalized in Arizona this November. This is due to the likely success of one or more of three public initiatives to legalize the production, distribution, sale and consumption of marijuana.

- 1) What is the current allocation of TPD resources to enforcement of laws prohibiting the production, sale, distribution and consumption of marijuana?
- 2) Has the TPD a plan in place to review the allocation of these resources and the possible reallocation of those resources in the event of legalization?

Competitive Compensation Structure

I have it on good authority that the Tucson Police Dept. has more than 300 Officers who receive annual compensation of \$100,000 or more.

- 1) Is the current management structure of the TPD "topheavy"?
- 2) How does the structure of compensation compare to police depts. in similar sized cities?
- 3) What is the experience of allocation of overtime in the TPD? Are Watch Commanders routinely questioned about overtime?
- 4) What proportion of total officer compensation is represented by overtime on average?
- 5) Is there a policy and procedure for examining the experience of overtime to determine the element(s) that drive the need for overtime?

I hope that my colleagues on the IAPC will find the observations and questions I raise stimulating and possibly motivating for us to examine some of these issues and answer some of these questions for the benefit of the public. Thank you.