Please see the Election Integrity Homepage for complete coverage and the latest news. Ms. Munday is first witness called by Pima County. They sought to illustrate that release of the database could harm counties with less security. They wound up eliciting a security horror story that undermined their own position. Advertisement Gila county has their … Read more

Please see the Election Integrity Homepage for complete coverage and the latest news. At the end of plaintiff’s testimony it is routine for the defendant to make what amounts to a renewed motion for summary judgment. In this context the motion would styled as motion for judgment as a matter of law. In any case, … Read more

Please see the Election Integrity Homepage for complete coverage and the latest news. Video footage of Dr. Gniady’s testimony: Please keep in mind this is not a transcript but a paraphrased and condensed summary. Rely at your own risk. Special thanks to Dave Safier for preparing this summary.Summary of testimony by Dr. Chris Gniady Direct … Read more

Please see the Election Integrity Homepage for complete coverage and the latest news. Please keep in mind this is not a transcript but a paraphrased and condensed summary. Rely at your own risk. Special thanks to Dave Safier for preparing this summary. Summary of testimony by Paul Eckerstrom Direct Examination by Bill Risner, attorney for … Read more

Please see the Election Integrity Homepage for complete coverage and the latest news.

Let me say this before anything else: Bryan Crane is not the villain of this story.

I don’t know if he did anything wrong, and that’s entirely beside the point in any case. The point is that anyone in Bryan Crane’s position certainly could do something wrong – and we would likely never know. That’s intolerable.

The point of this trial is not to prove that Mr. Crane, or anyone else, did anything improper or illegal – only that the opportunity exists. It is tempting to allow the appearance of impropriety, or the mere opportunity to do something wrong – both of which Democrats clearly are demonstrating in this trial – to shade into an accusatory lynching of a man’s character.

I don’t believe that there has been any evidence presented that proves to anywhere near a criminal degree of certainty that Mr. Crane or anyone else has committed a crime, or even behaved improperly. To be sure, there is evidence that is very troubling, even if all of the incidents the Democrats point to are adequately explained. And the only way to clear the air is get inside that database.

What is very troubling to many is how stubbornly Pima County officials have resisted the opportunity to reassure citizens concerned that their votes be honestly counted. That sort of stubborn intransigence strikes many as being consistent with how a guilty person reacts to an accusation; not by honestly trying to exonerate themselves by bringing forth all the facts, but by trying to withhold or "lose" critical evidence that could prove their guilt.

Only one thing is for certain – without access to the GEMS database files, the voters of Pima County haven’t any hope at all of finding out that our vote is being manipulated if someone in Crane’s position is less than honest.

I suspected that the testimony of Bryan Crane would prove pivotal in the case, but I might have underestimated his effect. His testimony could well prove to have been the deciding factor. One thing became undeniably clear: a person of less-than-perfect integrity and honesty in Mr. Cranes’ position would be a serious threat to the integrity of our elections.

The point of good security is both to prevent wrong-doing and to catch the culprit if you can’t prevent him. The very nature of computer processing and counting of our votes means that we really do have to rely on the probity and integrity of the people who operate the system. We can keep people out pretty effectively, but you can’t keep out those who are authorized. The best you can hope for is to be sure of catching them if they are doing something wrong; conservatives call that effective deterrence.

Trusting someone doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t check and be sure that our reliance is not misplaced. Our county officials seem to just want our trust, hold the checking.

There are several crucial points in Crane’s testimony. These are the ones I found to be most important:

Crane severely damaged his credibility right out of the gate by refusing to recognize the fundamental security flaws in the design of GEMS as problematic because access to the computer to outsiders is now well controlled. It’s as if he either can’t imagine an insider manipulating an election (stupid), or simply won’t admit that he imagined it all too clearly (Machiavellian). Finally forced to admit the obvious in redirect, that an unscrupulous operator could rig an election.

One of his most frequent phrases quickly became "I can’t recall," especially when confronted with the details of allegations about improper procedures. Judges know exactly what that phrase means.

He had a MS Access manual in the count room the night of the RTA election. Considering how busy elections are, the explanation that he was researching how to solve an equipment issue for a future election seemed implausible.

The allegation that he was taking home GEMS data backups is denied, but his explanation that co-workers were confused as to what data he was taking isn’t credible. His own assistant, who was trained to work on the same systems, seems unlikely to have been confused. No explanation offered why admin data would continue to be taken home even after there is a fire-proof safe available for election data.

Made implausible and patently fabricated explanations of the GEMS user log data showing unusual activity. Claims these were simply flukes or habits even though the interface is designed to ensure deliberation (must confirm actions).

Given the numerous accounts of Nelson getting summary reports during elections (and there is nothing wrong with that unless the information is shared to affect the election), Crane’s flat denial he had ever given Nelson such reports or seen Nelson with such reports during a count is not just an obvious lie, but a useless one.

The most damning result of Crane’s testimony to the County’s case came with the questioning by Judge Miller. His questioning laid bare the implausibility of the security threats the County points to as justification for continued confidentiality.

• Information in the GEMS database would allow creation of memory cards to manipulate the vote at the scanner. But tamper evident seals would have to be defeated. Only elections insiders could get away with this exploit and only if the information were obtained before or during an election.
• Information in the GEMS database would allow creation of rigged ballots to fool voters into voting for the wrong choices. But a conspiracy of poll workers would be required to introduce the fake ballots, and the exploit could be more simply in Photoshop. Again the information would have to be obtained prior to or during the election.
• A party obtaining a GEMS database could make alterations and claim the official tally is incorrect on the basis of their copy. But all parties get the data and the claim would easily be dismissed. I term this the reputational suicide attack. Could also be defeated by issuing the database on read-only media with unique identifiers on the media.

After the flip is the full summary of Bryan Crane’s testimony. Thanks to David Safier for his indefatigable assistance with these summaries. Please keep in mind these are not intended as transcripts, but condensed and paraphrased summaries…

Please see the Election Integrity Homepage for complete coverage and the latest news.

Chuck Huckelberry is the bureaucratic head cheese in Pima County government. His title is County Administrator, and he serves at the pleasure of the Pima County Board of Supervisors – theoretically. The political facts are a bit more nuanced.

Huckelberry, though a civil servant serving at the pleasure of the Board, has been in his current position since 1993, a respectable period of time in which to settle in, is it were. The general feeling amongst the political cogniscetti is that Huckelberry is not just a functionary, but a king-maker. His position has allowed him to influence strongly the appointment and election of members of the Board, giving him political influence that far outstrips what his job description or the county’s charter would suggest he has.

A contextual issue that must be kept in mind is that the department of elections used to report directly to the Board of Supervisors. When Brad Nelson was hired as director, he was made a direct report to Huckelberry, instead. Thus, any whiff of scandal in the elections department reflects directly on Huckelberry, as he hired Nelson and oversees his work directly.

There are persistent rumblings about the Pima elections department being transferred by the Board of Supervisors to the bailiwick of the elected County Recorder’s office, inhabited by Democrat F. Ann Rodriguez for the past 14 years. She has expressed a willingness to undertake the task after the 2008 election if given the additional personal compensation commensurate with the additional responsibility,  sufficient budget, and the policy leeway she needs to run the department as she thinks it should be. A concern for Huckelberry and Nelson is whether she would also change the leadership (very likely) and conduct an investigation into past practices and possible malfeasance (less likely, but terrifying).

A political concern for both the Democrats and Republicans at the state level, and on the Board of Supervisors, is what might happen if this trial begins to prompt the upending of rocks long left unturned in counties around the state? Thus the annoyance by his own party at Ray Carrol for cooperating, and the reticence of the Democrats to do the same. As intimated in the testimony of many in this trial, the security practices of other counties are just as bad, and often far worse thos in Pima county. It serves no insider’s interest to have potential scandals stirred up in a manner that can’t be carefully controlled.

As to Huckelberry’s testimony, it is about what one would expect from a careful administrator who is the veteran of a thousand bureaucratic death-matches. You don’t lay a glove on a guy as battle-tested as Chuck. You give him opportunities to be too smart for his own good.

One thing that became apparent was that Chuck claims credit for the decision not to release the database to the Democratic Party. That claim may warrant a closer examination at another time, but it certainly puts the public onus on him if this lawsuit doesn’t go his way.

He also clearly has no idea about the technicial issues involved and has relied very heavily on John Moffatt, his consultant who will testify in this trial, without having the curiosity to carefully question the threats his adviser was telling his the data’s release would pose. A stark contrast can be seen between Huckelberry’s unquestioning reliance on expertise, and the skeptical use of experts to draw one’s own conclusions and make a thorough evaluation displayed by the questioning of expert witnesses by Judge Miller in this trial. Keep an ear tuned here for the summary of Bryan Crane’s testimony for an example of the Judge’s style.

Another damaging admission that Chuck let slip was that Pima County had never in 30 years done an analysis of its elections systems because there has never been evidence or allegations that might warrant analysis. For an administrator who is basically asking the court to trust him, his management, and his people as the ultimate guarantor of the people’s vote, that shows a lack of diligence.

Finally, the real kicker is Chuck’s assertion on the stand that "a conspiracy of one is possible, a conspiracy of three is not." He asserts that there is no possible way that the elections department could have done anything wrong, or, in fact, could do anything wrong in the future, because it would require a conspiracy which is simply impractical. Yet, as you will see from Bryan Crane’s testimony, and likely will see again in Pima County’s expert testimony, that an exploit requiring such a large conspiracy it boogles the mind is one of the central threats they claim to justify the withholding the database from public scrutiny.

Video footage of Chuck Huckelberry’s testimony:

The testimony of James Barry is intended mainly to illustrate that the Pima County government had a deep, vested, and motivated interest in the outcome of the RTA election. They spent over $70 on Barry’s services alone in analyzing prior bond and tax elections, creating a plan to divide up projects based on possible electoral trouble areas, and creating a campaign plan. His testimony does indicate that anyone would actually work to steal the election, only that they had an explicit position and desire for approval of the measure.

Video footage of James Barry’s testimony:

After the flip is a full summary of the testimony by Huckelberry and Barry. Sincere thanks to Daivid Safier, without whom this project would be impossible. Please recall that these are not intended as transcripts but condensed and paraphrased summaries…

Please see the Election Integrity Homepage for complete coverage and the latest news.

The testimony of Brad Nelson, the Director of Pima County’s election department, is important as much for what he doesn’t know and refuses to say as for what he says and what he knows. The plaintiffs purpose is to paint for the judge a portrait of a manager out of touch with the fundamental work of his organization, ignorant of even the rudiments of computer technology, who fails to keep abreast of current information regarding election security, and relies entirely on the competence, judgment, and probity of his employees, even when they demonstrably should not enjoy his confidence. Such a manager can easily fail to take necessary steps to protect the integrity of the people’s elections without someone providing oversight over the inner workings of his organization, which he manifestly doesn’t understand and thus cannot be trusted to oversee himself.

Keep in mind that the improvements to security and integrity bruited by Nelson before the court, and later by the Pima County Administrator Chuck Huckleberry, came primarily not from the bureaucracy charged with the task of securing our elections, but from the very same committed activists working through the Democratic Party who are behind this suit.

Both Nelson and Huckleberry plant their flag on hand count audits as the best way to assure integrity, not oversight of the database; yet Dr. Ryan, the mind behind the hand count audit laws, is on the other side of this controversy saying unequivocally that the audit alone is not enough. The very same physical and procedural security measures the insiders now say are sufficient to prevent intrusion into their computer systems were suggested to them by Mickey Duniho, who says that now 100% of the threat is from the inside, and must be guarded against.

Nelson’s testimony strongly indicates that he was not only ignorant of security vulnerabilities in the GEMS system his organization uses, but seems to have actively avoided learning about them at times. When given opportunities to adjust practices to enhance integrity, such as a voluntary hand count audit prior to the 2006 passage of that law, he declined, and mischaracterized the capabilities of the systems he oversees to justify his refusal.

Nelson seems to have been woefully ignorant of deficiencies in basic security procedures in his own office such as handling of data backups and vote totals in summary reports, and even claimed ignorance as to the existence of a fire-proof safe in the office. He remains unwilling to look behind the statements of his employees, regardless of their self-contradictions or credibility. He has not conducted an internal investigation of a single allegation of wrong-doing. This is likely unacceptable behavior in a manager of a McDonalds. not to mention one charged with managing a task that requires the utmost public confidence and the highest standards of integrity.

When questioned about a box of tapes containing election databases from prior elections, Nelson became highly evasive. He claimed he had no knowledge of whether a particular tape containing RTA election database, which the Secretary of State’s office affirmed they did send, was ever received, even suggesting that it was never sent. Frankly, I would say that the County Attorney actively assisted the witness in trying to muddy the waters on this point, giving their imprimatur to the idea that the tape was never sent during cross exam. I was frankly disappointed to see such a amateurish ploy in a bench trial by a county attorney. Such antics might impress juries on occassion, but never a judge. Perhaps the presence of camera got the better of him, after all. This cavalier handing of the very data that is requested by the plaintiffs is a severe indictment of the seriousness with which Nelson’s organization actually regards the data that it now claims is too sensitive to release to the political parties.

Blake Moorlock and Garry Duffy produced an excellent piece in the Citizen on the issue of the missing RTA backup tape.

In a notable departure from his customary disinterest in security matters, Nelson claimed that he authorized the purchase of a crop scanner (a device used for reading and writing solid state memory cards, which can then be used to hack election scanners) after reading of an exploit on BlackBoxVoting.org. He authorized Bryan Crane to use the device to test the exploit, and finding security concerns, changed some procedures.

As a special bonus for those who are paying close attention, no, Nelson is never asked directly to confirm or deny a non-platonic relationship with Mary Martinson by either party.

Video footage of Brad Nelson’s testimony:

After the flip is a summary of Brad Nelson’s testimony. Thanks to Dave Safier, without whom this project would be impracticable. Please recall that this is not a transcript but a summary and condensation of testimony…