Pima County Election Integrity Trial: Testimony of Dr. Chris Gniady

Please see the Election Integrity Homepage for complete coverage and the latest news. Video footage of Dr. Gniady’s testimony: Please keep in mind this is not a transcript but a paraphrased and condensed summary. Rely at your own risk. Special thanks to Dave Safier for preparing this summary.Summary of testimony by Dr. Chris Gniady Direct … Read more

Pima County Election Integrity Trial: Testimony of Paul Eckerstrom

Please see the Election Integrity Homepage for complete coverage and the latest news. Please keep in mind this is not a transcript but a paraphrased and condensed summary. Rely at your own risk. Special thanks to Dave Safier for preparing this summary. Summary of testimony by Paul Eckerstrom Direct Examination by Bill Risner, attorney for … Read more

Pima County Election Integrity Trial: Testimony of Mr. Bryan Crane

Please see the Election Integrity Homepage for complete coverage and the latest news.

Let me say this before anything else: Bryan Crane is not the villain of this story.

I don’t know if he did anything wrong, and that’s entirely beside the point in any case. The point is that anyone in Bryan Crane’s position certainly could do something wrong – and we would likely never know. That’s intolerable.

The point of this trial is not to prove that Mr. Crane, or anyone else,
did anything improper or illegal – only that the opportunity exists. It is tempting to allow
the appearance of impropriety, or the mere opportunity to do something wrong
– both of which Democrats clearly are demonstrating in this trial – to shade
into an accusatory lynching of a man’s character.

I don’t believe that there has been any evidence presented that proves
to anywhere near a criminal degree of certainty that Mr. Crane or
anyone else has committed a crime, or even behaved improperly. To be
sure, there is evidence that is very troubling, even if all of the
incidents the Democrats point to are adequately explained. And the only way to clear the air is get inside that database.

What is very troubling to many is how stubbornly Pima County officials have resisted the opportunity to reassure citizens concerned that their votes be honestly counted. That sort of stubborn intransigence strikes many as being consistent with how a guilty person reacts to an accusation; not by honestly trying to exonerate themselves by bringing forth all the facts, but by trying to withhold or "lose" critical evidence that could prove their guilt.

Only one thing is for certain – without access to the GEMS database files, the voters of Pima County haven’t any hope at all of finding out that our vote is being manipulated if someone in Crane’s position is less than honest.

I suspected that the testimony of Bryan Crane would prove pivotal in the case, but I might have underestimated his effect. His testimony could well prove to have been the deciding factor. One thing became undeniably clear: a person of less-than-perfect integrity and honesty in Mr. Cranes’ position would be a serious threat to the integrity of our elections.

The point of good security is both to prevent wrong-doing and to catch the culprit if you can’t prevent him. The very nature of computer processing and counting of our votes means that we really do have to rely on the probity and integrity of the people who operate the system. We can keep people out pretty effectively, but you can’t keep out those who are authorized. The best you can hope for is to be sure of catching them if they are doing something wrong; conservatives call that effective deterrence.

Trusting someone doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t check and be sure that our reliance is not misplaced. Our county officials seem to just want our trust, hold the checking.

There are several crucial points in Crane’s testimony. These are the ones I found to be most important:

Crane severely damaged his credibility right out of the gate by refusing to recognize the fundamental security flaws in the design of GEMS as problematic because access to the computer to outsiders is now well controlled. It’s as if he either can’t imagine an insider manipulating an election (stupid), or simply won’t admit that he imagined it all too clearly (Machiavellian). Finally forced to admit the obvious in redirect, that an unscrupulous operator could rig an election.

One of his most frequent phrases quickly became "I can’t recall," especially when confronted with the details of allegations about improper procedures. Judges know exactly what that phrase means.

He had a MS Access manual in the count room the night of the RTA election. Considering how busy elections are, the explanation that he was researching how to solve an equipment issue for a future election seemed implausible.

The allegation that he was taking home GEMS data backups is denied, but his explanation that co-workers were confused as to what data he was taking isn’t credible. His own assistant, who was trained to work on the same systems, seems unlikely to have been confused. No explanation offered why admin data would continue to be taken home even after there is a fire-proof safe available for election data.

Made implausible and patently fabricated explanations of the GEMS user log data showing unusual activity. Claims these were simply flukes or habits even though the interface is designed to ensure deliberation (must confirm actions).

Given the numerous accounts of Nelson getting summary reports during elections (and there is nothing wrong with that unless the information is shared to affect the election), Crane’s flat denial he had ever given Nelson such reports or seen Nelson with such reports during a count is not just an obvious lie, but a useless one.

The most damning result of Crane’s testimony to the County’s case came with the questioning by Judge Miller. His questioning laid bare the implausibility of the security threats the County points to as justification for continued confidentiality.

  • Information in the GEMS database would allow creation of memory cards to manipulate the vote at the scanner. But tamper evident seals would have to be defeated. Only elections insiders could get away with this exploit and only if the information were obtained before or during an election.
  • Information in the GEMS database would allow creation of rigged ballots to fool voters into voting for the wrong choices. But a conspiracy of poll workers would be required to introduce the fake ballots, and the exploit could be more simply in Photoshop. Again the information would have to be obtained prior to or during the election.
  • A party obtaining a GEMS database could make alterations and claim the official tally is incorrect on the basis of their copy. But all parties get the data and the claim would easily be dismissed. I term this the reputational suicide attack. Could also be defeated by issuing the database on read-only media with unique identifiers on the media.

After the flip is the full summary of Bryan Crane’s testimony. Thanks to David Safier for his indefatigable assistance with these summaries. Please keep in mind these are not intended as transcripts, but condensed and paraphrased summaries…