The Kingman Assessment: excerpts

by David Safier

I posted yesterday that, in my non-lawyerly opinion, the conditions at the private, for-profit Kingman prison which resulted in the breakout of 3 prisoners and, most probably, the death of an innocent couple in New Mexico, qualify as criminal negligence. Whether my lay opinion has any legal basis is another story. But if it were up to me, I would put the people at the top of the Management Training Corporation in jail, and I would hold legislative hearings where the defenders of private prisons would have to justify their positions in the face of the gross incompetence demonstrated at Kingman.

I've read through the entire assessment done of the Kingman Prison facility by four inspectors after the breakout. The list of obvious and not-so-obvious problems is jaw dropping. This is not a case of a few people making a few mistakes or a few problems needing to be corrected. The management of Kingman, which housed over a hundred inmates convicted of murder and about 1400 others, was deplorable.

Here is a series of quotations from the assessment. I have grouped the comments of all 4 inspectors into specific problem areas.

Behavior and Appearance of Prisoners:

• "While monitoring chow turnout we witnessed a large percentage of the inmate population — about 75% — walking without identification cards. Many were out of grooming compliance (shirts untucked, beards, mustaches)."
• "The inmate attitude appeared to be poor. One inmate spoke in a disrespectful manner to the Warden when she questioned his lack of identification, another yelled out "Fuck ADC" [Arizona Dept. of Corrections] as we approached."
• "Grooming and housing compliance is not being enforced, giving the impression that the inmates are in control. DO 704 is in place yet the impression is that the staff are reluctant to challenge the inmates for compliance."

The Alarm System

• "The perimeter system at the Kingman Hualapi unit is not functioning properly, it is not maintained properly, it is not monitored correctly and it is not tested properly. The procedures currently in place for all aspects of this system have bred a culture of laxness among the staff."
• "Alarms [go off] excessively throughout day and night. Staff have become conditioned to the false alarms and react to them with complacency."
• "Zones are often left activated and unattended for extended periods of time."
• "Contract Maintenance on the system has not been performed for over one year."
• "The system has not been calibrated professionally by the contract vendor and IT staff report that staff complain if it is set to be too sensitive."
• "Staff report repeated documentation of malfunctioning alarms, yet Unit IT and Maintenance staff do not get these reports and the Security Device Inspection report does not contain them."
• "Maintenance of the system is done by the unit maintenance and IT staff. These staff have not been trained to maintain the system."
• "MTC [Management Training Corporation] officers and supervisors are not familiar with the system and are not properly trained to operate or test it."
• "The alarm system in the perimeter zones has not been serviced and maintained by trained experts. Maintenance staff check the system for power failures, cut cable, exposed cable, etc. If the discrepancy does not involve a mechanical problem, the issue is passed to the IT person. By his own admission, the IT person has read manuals on the system, but has received no formal, let alone advanced, training."
• "COs are inadequately trained on alarm procedures."

The Perimeter of the Prison [Note: Sand around the perimeter is essential for following tracks left by escapees or other unauthorized people.]

• "The perimeter is in fair condition. It is regularly raked and weeded by an inmate crew however it lacks sand and is somewhat dry and hard packed. It is difficult to see tracks, and in fact several tracks were laid out by our team were missed by the MTC staff."
• "COs even in the days after the escape, failed to detect tracks or to challenge team members' presence on the perimeter."
• "At the time of the escape only one perimeter patrol was in place."
• "Drainage ditches have been rocked in. They look visually pleasing but create a barrier to sound security practices. An inmate could hide in the ditch while the perimeter patrol passed and could go undetected."
• "I walked the zones with COs as well as Sergeants. None demonstrated the proper technique (crossing the zone at three distinct points in each zone)."
• "None understood how the zones worked or how they were activated."
• "None understood how the microwave system worked."
• "The perimeter monitor is set off to the side of the Main Control Officer. His primary focus is on yard cameras and opening gates."
• "Perimeter control failed to challenge our vehicle when entering the ASPC-Hualapai perimeter road. None of the additional "static" perimeter patrols communicated to the unit controls our presence. Both the static and mobile patrols failed to observe Major Lao planting tracks on the perimeter. The area was in direct view of both "static" perimeters."
• "Perimeter patrol failed to detect the "footprints" that Major Lao introduced to the outer sandtrap.
• "The perimeter patrol failed to log our presence on their perimeter in his correctional service journal."

The Armory and Training on Use of Weapons

• "The armory was out of compliance in several areas. Ammunition and inventory deficiencies were noted."
• "Dart equipment and drill procedures are also out of compliance. Weapons are stored loaded and drills are not being conducted regularly."
• "The Graves Perimeter Officer was not proficient with either weapon. He struggled to unload the shotgun and required assistance from the Swings officer and did not safely load the, "Hot Round," in the chamber on the 9mm."
• "No master inventory is maintained in the Armory or where weapons are stored. . . . This includes the Tower, DART lockers, and Regular Use Weapons storage areas."
• "Armory Post Order Sec. 1.8.7 requires a Daily [?] . . . The last inventory on the Duty Ammunition was also on 7/21/10. The Birdshot count was off by 800 rounds. . . . 00 Buck was off by 50 rounds."

Miscellaneous Items

• "Eight (8) light poles were noted with lights burned out."
• "Many of the officers did not effectively control  inmate movement during count. Inmates were not all at their bunks for a proper face to ID process. . . . in general it appeared to be a [problem with] staff training or lack of "command presence" issue in most cases."
• "Inmate pat searches are not being conducted. Warden Leider reports that random pat searches of inmates exiting chow are required but are not being done."
• "It appears that very little action was taken to prepare the physical plant and staff for the transition to medium custody in April of 2010. . . . No additional or follow-up training has been done with the MTC staff to assist with the transition of populations."
• "Captain Smith is ineffective in his role."
• "ADW Ramsey was very quick to advise multiple team members that he is not in the chain of command over the Captain and that he is not "over security."
• "Warren Leider attributes issues on the unit to the high percentage of new staff and supervisors. When asked what has been done to counteract this, she did not advise me of any additional training or mentoring."
• "Staff are fairly "green" across all shifts. Many staff have under one year of service. Finding staff with two or more years of service is rare."
• "I conservatively estimate that one third of security employees have less than three months on the job or in their promoted position. Furthermore, there is no FTO program to teach staff new to their job or position."
• "Most Post Orders had a signature gap of months and many had all recent signatures signed off by the same supervisor regardless of shift."
• "No time is allotted for briefing of any kind."
• "The unit still utilizes the use of metal horseshoes. Mop buckets in the housing unit still have metal rods that we eliminated years ago."

If the prison had one-fourth this many problems, it would be woefully out of compliance. Half this many problems, and it should be shut down for repairs and retraining. With this many problems, heads should roll, both at Management Training Corporation and in the Arizona Department of Corrections. And I don't mean low level or mid level heads. Problems of this magnitude go all the way to the top.